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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
Reforming NATO’s Partnerships 
Since 1994, NATO has created partnerships as an 
institutional framework for its relations with coun-
tries that cannot or do not want to become Alliance 
members. In the past 20 years, the circle of countries 
involved has become ever larger, the associated agenda 
ever more heterogeneous, and the goals pursued by 
NATO ever more diverse. The institutional prolifera-
tion of partnerships contrasts increasingly with what 
is potentially expected of them. The existing formats 
are now overdue for an effectiveness check so that 
they can be prioritised politically. 
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) groups 
together twelve post-Soviet states, among others. 
NATO has supported them in reforming their respec-
tive security sectors in line with western standards 
and bringing them closer to the Alliance. The forum 
also includes Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, 
non-allied states that need no assistance with their 
domestic transformation. What matters to them is 
the security cooperation with NATO. 
The countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) – 
Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauretania 
and Tunisia – were meant to receive NATO support 
primarily for cooperating with each other on security 
policy. In turn, this was intended to contribute to 
regional security. For a number of political reasons, 
however, the Dialogue has been only a limited success. 
The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which aspired 
to intra-regional cooperation between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, has likewise 
limped along. Saudi Arabia and Oman have been 
invited to join this forum, but have so far stood apart. 
Finally, there is Partners across the Globe (PATG), con-
sisting of countries that, for various reasons, are 
strategically important to NATO or have extensively 
contributed to its operations: Afghanistan, Australia, 
Iraq, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan and 
South Korea. Alongside this, there are consultations 
with India and China that to date have been informal. 
Special committees that handle relations with Georgia, 
Russia and the Ukraine – all of which are already 
members of the EAPC – complete the partnership pic-
ture. Finally, NATO’s summit in 2014 created further 
partnership formats in the Partnership Interoperability 
Initiative (PII) and the Defence and related Security Capacity 
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6 
Building Initiative (DCB), whose functions overlap to 
some extent with already existing formats. 
Most recently, two developments have attracted 
sustained attention to the NATO partnerships. First, 
NATO’s transformative potential and its experience 
in reforming national security sectors seem to be 
transferable to other regions. Such was the hope 
expressed during the wave of transformations in 
North Africa and the Middle East in 2011, as well as 
for Ukraine and Georgia. Current efforts to support 
Tunisia in reforming its security policy underline 
this approach. 
Second, for political and financial reasons, NATO 
will only be able or willing to carry out fewer crisis-
management operations in the coming years than 
to date. However, crises and conflicts necessitating a 
NATO intervention can still be expected to occur on 
the Euro-Atlantic periphery. It is likely to be the rule, 
rather than the exception, that such operations will 
be jointly planned and carried out with partners from 
outside the Alliance. Only a few years ago, this would 
have applied exclusively to international crisis manage-
ment; given the crisis in the Euro-Atlantic security 
order, however, it could now also be the case in collec-
tive defence. 
Against this backdrop, NATO will need to reorganise 
its partnership policy. This should be based on a shared 
idea of how to order political priorities and institu-
tional forms of cooperation, even though political con-
siderations may differ greatly from case to case. The 
study is intended to contribute to this reorganisation 
process by analysing two key questions: 
a) What priorities should NATO members set in 
designing the partnership formats, given the most 
recent developments in the security environment? 
Should the focus be on transforming partner coun-
tries, or on their security cooperation with each other, 
or on “strengthening” them according to the Alliance’s 
terms? Should the level of cooperation be measured 
in terms of the operative usefulness to NATO or the 
Alliance’s potential influence in a specific region? 
b) What institutional formats can be derived from 
these priorities? A whole spectrum of reorganisation 
models can be imagined. NATO members could keep 
the existing structure unchanged because they assume 
that it is logical to use different formats for different 
security policy interests. Or else they might discard 
the current formats to make room for a complete 
restructuring. 
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7 
NATO’s Partnership Formats: 
How an International Security Institution Adapts 
 
A large number of academic studies addressing NATO’s 
development since the end of the East-West conflict 
have analysed its institutional form from a conceptual 
perspective. Their main point of discussion tends to be 
the reasons behind NATO’s continued existence and 
behind its largely unchanged, core institutional char-
acteristics. After all, the Alliance’s key task of guaran-
teeing collective defence greatly lost in importance 
after 1990/1991, becoming a merely residual function 
– at least until the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted in 
2014. This school of research chiefly focuses on NATO’s 
institutional continuity in the face of the changes that 
have occurred in the international system.1 
This study takes the opposite approach. It examines 
NATO’s capacity for adapting its institutions to the 
changed international security parameters. It uses a 
concrete example: the partnership formats that have 
become increasingly differentiated both regionally 
and functionally since the 1990s.2 Research into the 
way international security organisations change, or 
rather adapt, shows that a series of factors determines 
whether new security formats are decided and what 
specific shape they take.3 
First, the stages in NATO’s development – each of 
which reflects an additional functionality of the insti-
tution – should be interpreted primarily as a reaction 
to the various changes or new phenomena in inter-
national politics. The end of the East-West conflict 
takes pride of place in this, with all the consequences 
 
1 Cf., for instance, Andrea Locatelli and Michele Testoni, “Intra-
Allied Competition and Alliance Durability: The Case for Promot-
ing a Division of Labour among NATO Allies”, European Security 
18, no. 3 (2009): 345–62; Anthony Forster and William Wallace, 
“What Is NATO For?”, Survival 43, no. 4 (2001): 107–22; Robert B. 
McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International 
Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 445–75. 
2 Cf. Anand Menon and Jennifer Welsh, “Understanding NATO’s 
Sustainability: The Limits of Institutionalist Theory”, in: Global 
Governance 17, no. 1 (2011): 81–94; Celeste A. Wallander, “Insti-
tutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War”, Inter-
national Organization, 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–35. 
3 The following volumes offer as instructive an overview as ever: 
Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander, 
eds., Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions Over Time and Space, Oxford 
1999; Helga Haftendorn and Otto Keck, eds., Kooperation jenseits 
von Hegemonie und Bedrohung. Sicherheitsinstitutionen in den inter-
nationalen Beziehungen (Baden-Baden, 1997). 
it has had for the Euro-Atlantic area. There are further 
elements of international change, however, that have 
challenged or continue to challenge NATO’s ability to 
adapt as an institution: the Balkan wars of the 1990s 
(meaning ethnic-national conflicts carried out by mili-
tary means on European soil); the repercussions of 
Islamist-inspired transnational terrorism; the fragile 
states on Europe’s periphery; and the wave of trans-
formations among Europe’s neighbours during the so-
called Arab Spring of 2011. The assumption that these 
new security challenges will be long-lasting is of pri-
mary importance in determing NATO’s reaction. NATO 
members have been prepared to adapt its institutional 
format only when they were convinced of the pro-
found nature of the change and its significant impact 
on their own security policies. 
Second, current research shows that transforma-
tions of international security institutions also express 
the internal division of power between member states. 
There is no need to go as far as some observers, who 
interpret NATO’s partnership policy as a direct deriva-
tive of the United States’ changed global strategy.4 
Given the US’s long-standing political hegemony with-
in NATO, however, it is appropriate that the partner-
ship formats should reflect Washington’s interests 
more strongly than those of smaller NATO members, 
or that these formats were not created against the will 
of the US government. At this juncture, it remains to 
be seen what impact the domestic transition that the 
US has undergone under President Obama will have 
on the durability and effectiveness of the partnership 
formats. This transformation goes hand-in-hand with 
an increased reluctance to shape the global political 
order. 
Third, the key to the permanence of international 
security institutions lies in their ability to adapt their 
institutions. Other international organisations have 
manifestly adapted their institutional form to changed 
parameters. In the case of the EU, the genesis of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and more 
 
4 For instance, Trine Flockhart, “Changing Partnerships in a 
Changing World”, in Cooperative Security: NATO’s Partnership Policy 
in a Changing World, ed. Trine Flockhart, DIIS Report 2014:01 
(Kopenhagen, 2014), 17–34 (29ff.). 
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8 
specifically of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) should be read as a process during which 
an organisation that was not explicitly founded to 
externalise security gradually built up institutional 
capacities for precisely that function. Inversely, insti-
tutions can disintegrate because they no longer have 
any functional added value – such as the Western 
European Union (WEU). In other cases, they continue 
to exist formally but are hollowed out functionally 
by the loss of their members’ political support. 
Fourth, NATO members had the option of making 
use of other, already existing institutions – such as 
the EU or OSCE – in shaping the security policy of the 
neighbouring regions. In principle, one could even 
imagine creating entirely new institutions for this 
purpose. To some extent, that did happen. Research 
has posited two interconnected explanations of why 
new foundations are relatively rare or rather why the 
“rival” institutions were not necessarily to the detri-
ment of NATO. First, the creation of new institutions 
generates significantly higher costs than the mainte-
nance or adaptation of existing ones. Second, an 
organisation does not allow itself to become superflu-
ous. Rather, it explores new topics and creates new 
institutional forms because of the variety of interests 
of its member states and especially of those actors who 
are active in the organisation. 
Fifth, the process of change concerns not only the 
form of the institution per se, but also (and especially) 
NATO’s rules of conduct and procedures, which need 
to be adapted or developed from scratch. Regular con-
sultations suffice to integrate some partners into the 
Alliance. However, other partner states contributing 
troop contingents to NATO operations demand to be 
continuously involved in the corresponding planning 
sessions. In general, international security institutions 
like NATO have the ability to adapt to new internation-
al parameters, especially through “their regulatory 
system finding appropriate responses to newly arising 
security problems and by having at their disposal pro-
cedures for regular reciprocal consultations and for 
adapting their rules.”5 Here, there is reason to assume 
a connection between the function that the partner-
ship format is expected to perform and the complexity 
of the body of rules. For example, integrating Aus-
tralia into the ISAF mission required a great number 
 
5 Helga Haftendorn, “Sicherheitsinstitutionen in den inter-
nationalen Beziehungen. Eine Einführung”, in Kooperation jenseits 
von Hegemonie und Bedrohung, ed. Haftendorn and Keck (see note 3): 
11–33 (29). 
of very specific NATO procedural rules whereas the 
participation of Moroccan officers in a NATO Defence 
College course needed far less coordination and co-
operation. 
Sixth, the argument of “functional continuity” pro-
vides clues as to why the NATO partnership formats 
have developed. From this perspective, the Alliance 
should be evaluated as a multi-functional or “hybrid” 
security institution that fulfils a wide range of func-
tions with different levels of intensity, rather than 
a one-dimensional system of collective defence (and 
nothing else). A number of studies have suggested 
that, already during the East-West conflict, NATO’s 
role was not confined to deterring an attack by the 
Warsaw Pact. Instead, ideas of security cooperation in 
the Euro-Atlantic area already played a part. The goal 
of cooperative security – one of the aims of the part-
nership formats – is in this perspective a permanent 
issue of Euro-Atlantic security policy. 
This short overview spells out that research has 
been primarily interested in what drives an institution 
to adapt to a changed international security environ-
ment. Little attention has been paid to the question 
of how effective the new elements are, and what their 
relationship is to each other. An international security 
institution can only be successful if it manages to solve 
the specific security problem for which it was created, 
or at least transforms it to such an extent that it no 
longer poses an acute threat to the participating states. 
Failing that, there is a risk of “institutional incrusta-
tion”, meaning that the institution’s specific formats 
of cooperation, while available, are no longer used. 
This is the more significant because the effective-
ness of NATO’s partnerships rests on two assumptions. 
First, all those involved must agree on what the secu-
rity problem to be tackled actually is. Second, solving 
the problem must lie within NATO’s power. In other 
words, the solution must not overlap with the conduct 
of other international actors or even entirely depend 
on it. This study will show that the second assumption 
in particular could (and can) not always be taken for 
granted in NATO partnership formats, which severely 
restricts their effectiveness in many areas. 
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The Four “Waves” of NATO Partnership Formats 
 
Even a cursory glance at NATO’s partnerships makes 
it clear that they are not a group of institutions which 
have been set up to pursue a package of coherent and 
clearly formulated political goals. Each is founded on 
the shared assumption that NATO outreach to non-
members and international organisations is good for 
maintaining security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic 
area. However, that is too low a common denominator 
to ensure a coherent approach to security policy in the 
respective regions. 
The term “partnership format” instead refers to 
an overarching category of heterogeneous institutions 
dedicated to coordination and cooperation, which 
have different raisons d’être and differ in their sphere 
of participation, degree of institutionalisation and 
political targets. Since each format was first created, 
its extent or functions have changed, in some cases 
significantly; so have NATO’s political ambitions asso-
ciated with them.6 The way in which the formats have 
evolved since 1994 thus reflects the Alliance’s changing 
priorities over that period of time. NATO’s partnership 
formats echo crucial security events and major devel-
opments in international relations. However, they also 
reveal adjustments in NATO’s self-perception: as an 
international security organisation that changes be-
cause the world around it is in upheaval. 
1. Security for Europe: 
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and 
Partnership for Peace 
NATO’s oldest partnership programme still in exist-
ence is the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It 
developed in 1997 out of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC), founded in 1991. As a multilateral 
forum for political dialogue and security cooperation 
that comprises 50 states (28 NATO members and 22 
partner countries), the EAPC is the framework for all 
 
6 On this point, cf. Sten Rynning, “Why Connect? On the Con-
ceptual Foundations of NATO Partnerships”, in Managing Change. 
NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World, ed. Riccardo 
Alcaro and Sonia Lucarelli (Norfolk, Bologna and Rome, 2011): 
II-5–II-8. 
forms of cooperation between the Alliance and its 
partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
NATO views this partnership format as an instru-
ment of cooperative security. In the Council, it dis-
cusses with the participating countries topics that 
are of general security interest, such as crisis manage-
ment, peace-keeping missions, disarmament and arms 
control, counterterrorism, WMD proliferation, etc. 
The EAPC also serves the more specific goal of making 
a lasting contribution to reforming security policy in 
the region’s countries. This included (and includes) 
placing individual states’ armed forces under the over-
sight of democratically legitimate parliaments and gov-
ernments and the justice system; if necessary, reduc-
ing the size of those forces without causing political 
upheavals; and, last but not least, ensuring a separa-
tion of responsibilities for internal versus external 
security. 
There was no coherent plan for the establishment 
of the EAPC, which developed rather by chance. The 
NACC had been conceived as a relatively small format 
for the then 16 NATO and seven Warsaw Pact mem-
bers. Later, the dissolution of the Soviet Union “im-
posed” on NATO much broader and more extensive 
cooperation than originally planned. There can be no 
question here of a strategically thought-out partner-
ship policy from the start. Not least, this can be seen 
in the fact that Russia and Ukraine are members of the 
EAPC, while also enjoying independent bilateral part-
nerships with the Alliance. Those formats are far more 
important politically: the NATO Russia Council, which 
has existed since 2002, and the NATO Ukraine Com-
mission, created in 1997. 
The programme Partnership for Peace (PfP) fulfils a 
similar function to the EAPC although NATO does not 
explicitly run it as a separate partnership format, but 
as a subdivision of the EAPC. The format, created in 
1994, offers states a framework for individually tailored 
cooperation programmes with NATO. Such programmes 
can focus on quite different areas: reforming the de-
fence sector, defence planning, civilian-military rela-
tions, education and training, joint manoeuvres, 
disaster relief, and more. 
Thr PfP programme is primarily bilateral, i.e. aimed 
at the cooperation of individual countries with NATO. 
The Four “Waves” of NATO Partnership Formats 
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Its intended outcome, however, is to safeguard secu-
rity in the entire Euro-Atlantic area. To this end, the 
Alliance strives to familiarise the 22 PfP partners with 
its procedures, make the defence planning of the in-
dividual states more transparent, and improve secu-
rity cooperation in general. Alongside these functions, 
the programme’s main purpose is to provide European 
states pursuing a policy of neutrality or non-align-
ment – such as Switzerland, Ireland, Austria, Finland 
and Sweden – an opportunity for extended coopera-
tion with NATO.7 Since the NATO foreign ministers’ 
meeting in Berlin in April 2011, all programmes and 
action plans of the PfP format have also been available 
to other NATO partner countries. They are listed in the 
so-called Partnership Cooperation Menu, which consists of 
almost 1,600 activities. 
The EAPC and PfP have never explicitly been iden-
tified as institutions that prepare countries for full 
NATO membership. Their functional proximity to 
NATO’s policy of expansion in Central Eastern Europe 
was nevertheless obvious. The goal of the partnership 
frameworks for the Euro-Atlantic area was to bring 
about different levels of rapprochement between NATO 
and the states in Central Eastern Europe as well as the 
former Soviet Union. This was intended to transform 
their security and defence policies and thus guarantee 
stability and security beyond the NATO membership 
circle.8 Implicitly, NATO’s policy was not only self-
interested, but also had a value dimension, insofar as 
its medium and long-term goal was to transform these 
states in line with western political conceptions. 
NATO’s 2010 strategic concept once again placed 
both the EAPC and the PfP in a context of cooperative 
security: “The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and 
Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of 
Europe whole, free and in peace.”9 However, seeing 
that the Euro-Atlantic security order entered into a 
state of crisis after the Russian Federation’s annexa-
 
7 On this point, cf. Andrew Cottey, “The European Neutrals and 
NATO: Ambiguous Partnership”, Contemporary Security Policy 34, 
no. 3 (2013): 446–72; and Magnus Petersson, “NATO and the EU 
‘Neutrals’ – Instrumental or Value-oriented Utility?”, in NATO: 
The Power of Partnerships, ed. Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland 
Matlary and Magnus Petersson (New York, 2011): 112–30. 
8 Flockhart appropriately calls it the “integrationalist rationale” 
of this wave of expansions. Cf. Flockhart, “Changing Partner-
ships in a Changing World” (see note 4), 27f. 
9 Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence 
and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
adopted by heads of state and government in Lisbon, Paragraph 
35, http://www.nato.diplo.de/contentblob/2970688/Daten/ 
971427/strat_Konzept_Lisboa_DLD.pdf (accessed 25 May 2016). 
tion of Crimea, the reverse is true as well. While 
Europe appears divided again and is no longer at 
peace with itself, the impact of the two partnership 
tools also remains limited. 
This fundamentally affects the Alliance’s self-image. 
Long before the annexation of Crimea and the destabi-
lisation of eastern Ukraine, the transformative impulse 
that had guided NATO in shaping Euro-Atlantic secu-
rity since 1990 began to flag in the face of Moscow’s 
changed politics. In NATO’s capitals, it was the war in 
Georgia (2008) that finally gave geopolitical considera-
tions the upper hand over the goal of further trans-
forming the post-Soviet space. For as long as it remains 
impossible to return to the principles of the Paris 
Charter, neither the EAPC nor PfP will be able to have 
an impact as partnership frameworks. 
2. Confidence-building and intra-regional 
cooperation: The Mediterranean Dialogue 
and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 
In addition to the two partnership frameworks that 
target the states of Central Eastern Europe and the 
post-Soviet region, NATO launched the Mediterranean 
Dialogue (MD) in 1994. The states participating in the 
forum are Egypt, Algeria (since 2000), Israel, Jordan 
(since 1995), Morocco, Mauretania and Tunisia. The 
aim of the framework is to boost security and stability 
in the Mediterranean region and dismantle wariness 
of NATO. It makes possible consultations and coopera-
tion between NATO and individual MD partners as 
well as in the NATO+7 format, i.e. jointly with all par-
ticipating states. 
The political inspiration for the MD format were 
the so-called Oslo Accords of 1993, i.e. the autonomy 
agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, which 
were augmented by a multilateral strand of the Madrid 
Middle East Peace process. The latter concentrated on 
topics of regional cross-border relevance such as en-
vironmental issues, economic development and secu-
rity. Not least, the negotiations were intended to serve 
as a confidence-building measure to contribute to 
normalising relations between the states of the Middle 
East. This intra-regional security cooperation in the 
Mediterranean countries was supported by NATO. 
In its early days, however, the MD received little 
attention. It barely rose above the status of a “diplo-
matic talking shop”. Only the attacks of 11 September 
2001 raised the interest of NATO members in the 
Alliance’s southern flank. At the 2002 NATO Summit 
2. Confidence-building and intra-regional cooperation: The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 
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11 
in Prague, the Alliance finally integrated the MD into 
the set of already existing partnership frameworks.10 
Since then, security and stability in the Mediterranean 
region have been considered decisive for the security 
of the NATO area, whether in the context of transna-
tional terrorism, WMD proliferation, energy security 
or managing migration.11 From the perspective of its 
contributions to NATO operations, the MD is of minor 
importance – Jordan was the only partner nation to 
participate in the ISAF mission, for example, and then 
only with a relatively small contingent. 
Two factors have been limiting the effectiveness of 
the MD. First, the forum consists of a very heterogene-
ous group of North African and Middle Eastern states, 
with little to link them in terms of security policy. To 
name just three examples: Tunisia is interested in re-
forming the defence sector; Jordan wishes to cooper-
ate with NATO in the context of Islamic State’s ad-
vances; and Israel is preoccupied with exchanging 
with NATO on missile defence. Against this backdrop, 
NATO has repeatedly considered dividing the MD into 
two regional subgroups: one for the Maghreb (Algeria, 
Morocco, Mauretania and Tunisia) and one for the 
Mashriq (Egypt, Israel, Jordan).12 In 2008, the NATO 
states who are also members of the EU created the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EUROMED), an in-
strument which theoretically complements the MD 
but actually competes with it, and which has been 
undermining any serious and exclusive international 
security focus on the MD.13 
At the 2004 NATO Summit, the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative (ICI) was added to the mix. It pools NATO’s 
relations with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates. This format was (and is) likewise based 
on the assumption that international security chal-
 
10 Cf. Mohammed Moustafa Orfy, NATO and the Middle East. The 
Geopolitical Context post-9/11, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern 
Politics, 30 (London, 2011), 109ff.; and Sten Rynning, “NATO and 
the Broader Middle East, 1949–2007: The History and Lessons of 
Controversial Encounters”, The Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 6 
(2007): 905–27 (919ff.). 
11 On the increased importance of the Mediterranean region 
for NATO, cf. Costanza Musu, “NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: 
More than Just an Empty Shell?”, Mediterranean Politics 11, no. 3 
(2006): 419–24 (419f.); and Philip H. Gordon, NATO’s Growing Role 
in the Greater Middle East, ECSSR – Emirates Lecture Series, 63 (Abu 
Dhabi, 2006), 3ff. 
12 Cf. Pierre Razoux, How to Revitalize the Dialogue between NATO 
and the Maghreb Countries, NATO Defense College Research Paper, 
64 (Rome, 2010), 2f. 
13 On the dangers of an institutional “overload” in the Mediter-
ranean region, cf. Massimo Ambrosetti, “NATO’s Mediterranean 
Dialogue”, The International Spectator 36, no. 14 (2001): 83–89 (87f.). 
lenges in the Arab Persian Gulf can also have indirect 
consequences for the security of NATO states and that 
they should be jointly solved, i.e. together with the ICI 
partner nations. Reflections focused above all on grow-
ing concerns about a proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and on fighting transnational terrorism.14 
As in the MD, ICI partners also have the opportunity 
of choosing between bilateral and multilateral coopera-
tion. So far, however, the ICI has been insufficiently 
multilateralised, and has thus not developed into a 
true regional security forum. This is primarily due 
to the non-involvement of Saudi Arabia and Oman, 
which are responsible for over half of the total defence 
expenditure of all the region’s states. Other countries 
in the Arab Persian Gulf are in fact looking to cooper-
ate with NATO, but their understanding of security 
interests is primarily national. Individual ICI partners 
have even made it plain that they are less interested 
in good relations with NATO per se than in relations 
with selected Alliance members, principally the United 
States, Great Britain and France.15 
This reflects the nature of the regional order, which 
has been shaped as much by the Saudi-Iranian power 
struggle as by the general willingness to resort to the 
use of military force. It also shows that the region 
gives primacy to bilateral security policies over organ-
ising collective defence or collective security. This is 
shown not least in the great number of individual 
security agreements that the region’s states have con-
cluded with external actors.16 
NATO is currently considering building an institu-
tionalised partnership with the Gulf Cooperation 
 
14 Cf. the declaration of the Istanbul Summit: “Istanbul Co-
operation Initiative”, NATO Policy Document, http://www.nato. 
int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm (accessed 
19 May 2016); on the areas of practical cooperation, see NATO’s 
“ICI Fact Sheet” of April 2014 at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/ 
assets/pdf/pdf_2014_04/20140331_140401-factsheet-ICI_en.pdf 
(accessed 19 May 2016). See also the speech by the NATO Deputy 
Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow in Doha on 2 May 2015, 
“Preventing WMD Proliferation: NATO’s Engagement with its 
Global Partners”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_ 
117732.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 19 May 2016). 
15 Cf. Bilal Y. Saab, “Friends with Benefits. What the UAE Really 
Wants from NATO”, Foreign Affairs Snapshot, 14 August 2014, https:// 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-08-14/friends-
benefits (accessed 19 May 2016). 
16 On this issue, cf. Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, NATO in the ‘New’ 
MENA Region. Competing Priorities amidst Diverging Interests and Finan-
cial Austerity, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs – Secu-
rity in Practice, 1/2013 (Oslo, 2013), 20; Jean-Loup Samaan, NATO 
in the Gulf: Partnership without a Cause?, NATO Defense College 
Research Paper, 83 (Rome, 2012), 5f. 
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Council (GCC); any actual agreement, however, is still 
in the distant future. Brussels sees the GCC as a poten-
tial partner in the task of guaranteeing regional secu-
rity on the Alliance’s southern flank.17 NATO’s growing 
interest in more extensive cooperation is also based 
on the GCC’s declared intention of becoming an in-
dependent collective-defence organisation with inte-
grated military capabilities. The NATO visit by GCC 
Secretary General Abdul Latif Al Zayani in March 2016 
served the goal of improving mutual relations. 
The transformative drive, which has been charac-
terising the EAPC, is largely missing for the Mediter-
ranean region and the Arab Persian Gulf, i.e. both in 
the MD and in the ICI. In both forums, NATO’s col-
laboration with the partner countries is intended to 
familiarise them with Alliance procedures. However, 
the partnerships focus more on cooperation with the 
countries than on their potential transformation, let 
alone embedding them in the Euro-Atlantic order. 
Thus, a shared value base or possible NATO member-
ship for individual partner nations effectively have 
no role to play, even though policy advisors do bring 
up these prospects every now and again.18 As a result, 
expectations that NATO might contribute to the de-
mocratisation of North African and Middle Eastern 
states by supporting reform of the defence sector 
remain unfulfilled. 
The aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring – the 
wave of protests and revolutions against authoritarian 
regimes and political and social conditions that swept 
through various Middle Eastern and North African 
states (including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria) from 
December 2010 onwards – strikingly illustrated the 
limitations of this approach. Following the uprisings, 
established power structures were ultimately restored. 
 
17 Cf., on this point, Christopher S. Chivvis, “NATO’s Southern 
Exposure. The Real Threats to Europe – and the Alliance”, Foreign 
Affairs Snapshot, 17 April 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/2016-04-17/nato-s-southern-exposure (accessed 19 May 
2016); and, on ideas for how Middle Eastern and North African 
states could shoulder some of NATO’s operative burden: Sally 
Khalifa Isaac, NATO and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Security: 
Prospects for Burden Sharing, NATO Defense College Forum Paper, 
16 (Rome, 2011). 
18 These deliberations mostly concerned Israel. Cf., most recent-
ly, Shlomo Ben Ami, “Israel and NATO – Between Membership 
and Partnership”. A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herz-
liya Conference 2010, http://www.herzliya conference.org/ 
_Uploads/3045israelNATO.pdf (accessed 19 May 2016); and Josef 
Joffe, “Israel and NATO: A Good Idea Whose Time Will Never 
Come”, BESA Center Perspectives Papers, 77 (Ramat Gan, 2009), 
http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-and-nato-a-good-
idea-whose-time-will-never-come/ (accessed 25 May 2016). 
The Alliance was hence unable to contribute to any 
lasting transformation of these countries’ security or 
defence policies, in sharp contrast to its achievements 
in Central Eastern Europe (if under different condi-
tions). The only exception merely confirms the rule: 
since summer 2015, NATO has made cautious efforts 
to accompany Tunisia in transforming its security 
policy.19 In January 2016, urged on by Spain, France 
and Italy, NATO’s Military Committee consulted on an 
appropriate package of measures for Tunis. To date, 
however, the Tunisian government seems unwilling 
to make open use of Alliance support, preferring bi-
lateral cooperation with individual NATO members. 
The Alliance’s partnership activities played no part 
in the efforts to (militarily) contain the Syrian civil 
war, fight Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, or build up 
effective Iraqi security forces – apart from the largely 
unsuccessful NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I, 2004–
2011).20 In April 2016, NATO followed up on the NTM-I 
to a limited extent by financing the training of 350 
Iraqi officers in Jordan.21 Both of NATO’s other Medi-
terranean missions are preventative in nature and 
more an expression of political solidarity than of 
military stabilisation. 
Operation Active Fence aims to protect Turkey from 
attacks launched from within the neighbouring coun-
try of Syria, torn by civil war. The goal of the maritime 
Operation Active Endeavour, which ran from 2001 until 
2016, was to contribute to the discovery and deterrence 
of terrorist activities in the Mediterranean region.22 
However, the two missions have hardly been a state-
ment of NATO’s ability to stabilise North Africa or the 
Middle East, or of its legitimacy there as an inter-
national security institution. 
It is hard to discern whether and to what extent the 
joint fight against Islamic State might be a catalyst for 
improving cooperation between NATO and its Middle 
Eastern partner countries within the MD or ICI frame-
works. In a speech to those states in December 2014, the 
then-NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
 
19 Two high-ranking visits in the past year served this goal: 
Thrasyvoulos Terry Stamatopoulos, NATO Assistant Secretary 
General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, travelled to 
Tunis in June 2015; in September, the Tunisian Foreign Minister 
Taieb Baccouche in turn visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels. 
20 On the track record of the NTM-I, cf. Florence Gaub, Against 
all Odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA Region (Carlisle, PA: 
United States Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute, 
August 2012), 13ff. 
21 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 878 (2016): 2. 
22 Cf. Dieter Stockfisch, “NATO-Operation ‘Active Endeavour’ im 
Mittelmeer”, Europäische Sicherheit & Technik 63, no. 4 (2014): 52ff. 
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did emphasise the shared threat perception and the 
Alliance’s efforts towards capacity-building and mili-
tary cooperation. The fact that the MD countries have 
been integrated into the regular consultations with 
the NATO chief of staff since January 2016 points in 
the same direction.23 However, for as long as NATO 
as an institution does not play any part in fighting IS, 
these efforts will yield only limited results. 
3. Contributions to NATO operations: 
Partners across the Globe 
The third “wave” of NATO partnerships began in a 
relatively small way as long ago as the 1990s, with 
the Alliance’s operations in the Balkans, in which 
Argentina24 and China participated. These formats, 
however, were selective, short-lived and little shaped 
by political considerations. It was not until NATO took 
over control of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003 that considera-
tions about the operative integration of partners 
became politically decisive. The ISAF operation – the 
Alliance’s longest and most extensive to date – signifi-
cantly changed the status of partner countries and the 
expectations placed on them. Time and again, NATO 
representatives emphasised that ISAF was not just a 
mission by its 28 member states, but one in which 
over 50 countries had participated in some form or 
other. These statements were driven as much by an 
attempt to provide greater legitimacy for NATO’s own 
actions as by the endeavour to gain additional military 
capabilities. The Alliance cultivated a new perspective 
on partnerships with this far-reaching integration of 
non-members into the ISAF mission. Since, the Alliance 
no longer evaluates partnership formats solely on the 
basis of what it can do for its partners, but also in the 
light of what partners can do for it: in other words, 
what real military contributions they can make to 
ongoing operations.25 
NATO’s goal is to establish lasting connections with 
non-members that have substantial military capabili-
ties and are willing to deploy them within NATO opera-
tions. At the same time, it wants to preserve and har-
 
23 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 855 (2015): 5. 
24 Cf., on this point, Federico Merke, “Political and Military 
Utility of NATO for Argentina”, in NATO: The Power of Partnerships, 
ed. Edström, Matlary and Petersson (see note 7): 181–208 (185f.). 
25 On this paradigm shift, cf. Rebecca R. Moore, “Lisbon and the 
Evolution of NATO’s New Partnership Policy”, in Perceptions 17, 
no. 1 (2012): 55–74. 
ness for future deployments any experiences already 
made in the area of what is known as interoperability. 
Future missions could be in highly unstable conflict 
zones, but also to fight piracy, defend against cyber-
threats, etc. This “operational” rationale behind part-
nerships is primarily based on NATO’s self-interests 
in maintaining, extending and improving its military 
capabilities. It became the case from the 1990s on-
wards, when NATO’s operations were increasingly 
geographically remote from the Alliance area and 
took place within new security contexts. NATO is not 
nearly in a position to act as a provider of global secu-
rity either through its membership structure or its 
operations.26 At the same time, however, its assertions 
of political order have long exceeded the Euro-Atlantic 
space. From this perspective, the global partnerships 
are an almost inescapable consequence of the globali-
sation of security challenges and the geographical ex-
tension of NATO’s operational area that results from it. 
The very nature of the Alliance, however, has been 
changed by the expectations placed on partners and 
the fact that their contributions have become a firm 
part of NATO planning. The integration of partner 
countries into NATO operations consolidates a devel-
opment that has been noticeable for some time. NATO 
operations outside the Alliance area are still subject 
to unanimous approval in the North Atlantic Council 
by all 28 members. However, for a variety of political 
reasons, ever fewer NATO members take part in imple-
menting the decisions. Instead, the Alliance is trans-
forming into a sort of “operative platform”, whose 
missions are also open to partner countries depending 
on the kind of operation, region and military require-
ment. The 2011 mission in Libya, Operation Unified Pro-
tector, exemplified this development. It saw the partici-
pation of the partner nations of Jordan, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Sweden alongside 14 NATO 
members.27 In light of the limited defence budgets of 
NATO countries and the evident reservations in many 
NATO capitals about participating in further crisis-
management operations, this looks like a development 
that will be hard to reverse in coming years. To that 
 
26 On this older debate, cf. Tobias Bunde and Timo Noetzel, 
“Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO”, Con-
temporary Security Policy 31, no. 2 (2010): 295–318; and Thomas 
S. Mowle and David H. Sacko, “Global NATO: Bandwagoning in 
a Unipolar World”, Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 3 (2007): 
597–618. 
27 Cf. Fredrik Doeser, “Sweden’s Participation in Operation 
Unified Protector: Obligations and Interests”, International Peace-
keeping 21, no. 5 (2014): 642–57. 
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extent, this dimension of the partnership policy also 
has repercussions for NATO itself. Since the integra-
tion into NATO operations of partner countries – or 
rather of their military capacities – is becoming the 
rule, it is now easier for NATO members not to take 
part in certain missions at all. In the long term, this 
trend threatens to create an “Alliance à la carte”.28 
In the Partners across the Globe (PATG) framework, 
NATO categorises a handful of countries so as to 
underline their special status. They are Afghanistan, 
Australia, Iraq, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakis-
tan and South Korea. However, two of these countries 
– Afghanistan and Iraq – fall outside of the outlined 
operative logic since their own fragile security situa-
tion raises substantial doubts about their ability to 
contribute to future NATO operations at all, and if 
so, to which areas. Rather, their inclusion expresses 
NATO’s continued determination to assign them a 
prominent – though not explicitly formulated – status 
in its security policy, a status that is the equivalent 
of the “strategic partnership” in other foreign-policy 
contexts. 
In terms of their function, the PATG are nothing 
new. They are a cross-sectional category, or rather 
an additional format for those countries that do not 
belong to the formalised partnership frameworks 
already mentioned. As pointed out above, in the past 
few years countries from other partnership frame-
works have also taken part in NATO operations and in 
certain cases provided substantial contingents: espe-
cially the neutral European states in the EAPC, Jordan 
(MD), and Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (ICI). 
NATO cooperates with the PATG countries on an 
individual basis. The partner nations independently 
decide on the particular areas in which they want to 
increase their cooperation with the Alliance. In 1998, 
NATO had already loosely grouped these states together 
as Contact Countries. Since then, they have had a 
standing invitation to participate in the Alliance’s ac-
tivities – not only its operations, but also its exercises 
and conferences. The framework for the outlined 
operative dimension was created at the NATO Summit 
in Riga in 2006. In so doing, the meeting underlined 
a facet of the global partnerships that is often over-
looked because of the predominance of security issues: 
their value dimension. The Alliance’s aim is to con-
 
28 Cf. Jakub M. Godzimirski, Nina Græger and Kristin M. Hauge-
vik, Towards a NATO à la Carte? Assessing the Alliance’s Adaptation to 
New Tasks and Changing Relationships, NUPI-Report (Oslo: Norwe-
gian Institute of International Affairs [NUPI], 2010). 
struct a form of cooperation that is not only guided by 
shared security interests, but also based on a consensus 
on political principles such as democracy, the rule 
of law and human-rights protection. It is self-evident 
that this aspiration comes up against the limits of the 
actual partnership formats and restricts their effec-
tiveness.29 
Since 2011, in accordance with the decisions of the 
Lisbon Summit and the foreign ministers’ meeting in 
Berlin, the PATG nations have had access to the same 
partnership instruments as partners from other for-
mats.30 Forms of cooperation range from joint exer-
cises and operations to collaborating on training 
issues and information exchange between the intelli-
gence services. Yearly Individual Tailored Cooperation 
Packages of Activities complement these projects. 
The PATG countries take part on an equal footing 
in the military planning sessions for individual opera-
tions. The responsibility for this lies with liaison offi-
cers at the appropriate committees in Brussels and at 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Part-
ner countries also participate in NATO members’ 
political meetings, as can be seen from the sessions 
of heads of state and government as part of the NATO 
summits of the past few years.31 Building on this, in-
dividual PATG nations have added a political facet to 
the operative dimension by taking up regular political 
consultations with NATO. Most have an ambassador in 
Brussels to represent them. Currently, out of the PATG 
countries, Australia, Mongolia and New Zealand are 
especially active in NATO missions. They are partici-
 
29 Cf. the Riga Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Riga on 29 November 2006, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 
official_texts_37920.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 25 May 
2016), Para. 12: “we task the Council in Permanent Session 
to further develop this policy, in particular to: […] increase the 
operational relevance of relations with non-NATO countries, 
including interested Contact Countries; and in particular to 
strengthen NATO’s ability to work with those current and 
potential contributors to NATO operations and mission, who 
share our interests and values”, http://www.nato.int/docu/ 
pr/2006/p06-150e.htm# partnerships (accessed 19 May 2016). 
30 Cf. the Lisbon Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Lisbon on 20 November 2010, Para. 24–28, http://www.nato.int/cps/ 
en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm#partners (accessed 19 May 
2016). 
31 Cf., as an example, the declaration of the 2014 Summit: Wales 
Summit Declaration on Afghanistan. Issued by Heads of State and Govern-
ment of Allies and their International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
Troop Contributing Partners, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 
news_112517.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 19 May 2016). 
4. 2014, the crisis year: Partnerships as a defence against external threats 
SWP Berlin 
Reforming NATO’s Partnerships 
January 2017 
 
 
 
15 
pating in the maritime mission Operation Ocean Shield 
(Australia/New Zealand) – whose goal is to fight piracy 
around the Horn of Africa – and in the ISAF follow-up 
mission Operation Resolute Support (Australia/Mongolia), 
which provides education, consultancy and training 
for Afghan security forces. 
Finally, NATO entertains relations with individual 
states outside of the formalised partnership formats. 
The political consultations with China,32 India,33 Singa-
pore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Colombia are elevated 
to a higher status than the “normal” relations NATO 
has with its surroundings by the prominence that the 
Alliance confers on them. The dominant diplomatic 
mantra here is that it is always sensible to consult 
with one another on security matters.34 On closer in-
spection, however, one cannot avoid the impression 
that NATO is more interested in extended relations 
than the other side. 
This mismatch concerns above all the Alliance’s 
activities in South and Southeast Asia, where the 
rationales for forming partnerships in other contexts 
do not apply. NATO neither strives to contribute to the 
internal transformation of the countries in question, 
nor does it have the means to do so. Given the existing 
conflicts in the region, there is indeed a need to boost 
intra-regional security cooperation. For external ac-
tors, this is generally a difficult topic, but it is particu-
larly so for NATO, which is not perceived as an “Asian 
actor”. And finally, the countries mentioned have to 
date been unwilling to deploy contingents on NATO-
led operations, thus putting them under its command. 
This type of cooperation has been limited by questions 
of national sovereignty as much as a lack of experience 
of interoperability. Conversely, NATO deliberately 
keeps its “Asian profile” low to avoid its partnership 
activities being misunderstood as a taking of sides in 
 
32 Cf. Mads Kjeldsen and Friis Arne Petersen, “China and NATO: 
Room for Partnership?”, in Cooperative Security, ed. Flockhart (see 
note 4): 87–98; Tania M. Chacho, “Potential Partners in the Pacific? 
Mutual Interests and the Sino-NATO Relationship”, The Journal of 
Contemporary China 23, no. 87 (2014): 387–407. 
33 Cf. Robert Helbig, NATO – India: Prospects of a Partnership, NATO 
Defense College Research Paper, 73 (Rome, 2012); and David 
Scott, “NATO and India: The Politics of Strategic Convergence”, 
International Politics 49, no. 1 (2012): 98–116. 
34 Cf., e.g., Michael Rühle, “Die NATO auf dem Drahtseil”, Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 September 2015: “NATO must […] not 
let the impression arise that its partners have fulfilled their duty 
as soon as the joint Afghanistan deployment ends. In the era of 
globalisation, good relations with other states are an investment 
that will continue to pay off.” 
the region’s conflicts, or even as an informal promise 
of assistance to one of the parties involved. 
4. 2014, the crisis year: Partnerships as a 
defence against external threats 
The first three “waves” of partnerships were founded 
on the assumption that due to the changed security 
environment NATO would hardly ever be called upon 
to provide its traditional core function of collective 
defence, given the de-facto absence of external threats. 
Politically, cooperative security became the Alliance’s 
guideline and goal from the early 1990s onwards, in 
light of the profound transformation of the Euro-
Atlantic security order. Militarily, the task of defend-
ing the Alliance and its member nations gradually 
receded into the background as well. A series of in-
dicators elucidates this: the low number or even total 
absence of relevant Allied military exercises; the lack 
of military structures for defending Central Europe 
(such as headquarters or pre-deployment of arma-
ments); and, not least, the decreasing defence budgets 
in the majority of NATO states. These budget cuts 
expressed the commonly held assumption that the 
changed security situation made such investments 
superfluous. The declining interest in NATO’s global 
military crisis management once the ISAF mission 
was completed only intensified this trend.35 
Since then, a fourth wave of NATO’s partnership 
policy has been in evidence. Its circumstances are 
quite different from the previous three. The Alliance 
now pursues the intention of strengthening neigh-
bouring non-members. Its immediate aim is to im-
prove and expand these states’ military capabilities. 
Indirectly, NATO hopes to deter external threats to its 
members’ territorial integrity and political sovereign-
ty. In short, its partnership policy is now also being 
harnessed as a function of collective defence. 
This “return” to collective defence was triggered by 
two factors. First, Russia’s revisionist defence policy 
under President Putin, which has, to date, been most 
strongly expressed in the annexation of Crimea and 
Moscow’s ongoing policy of destabilising eastern 
Ukraine. This is no direct concern of NATO’s since 
 
35 Cf., on this point, the annual compilation of NATO members’ 
arms spending, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO 
Defence”, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm 
(accessed 19 May 2016); and the relevant SIPRI data sets for the 
years 1949 to 2014 at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/ 
milex/milex_database (accessed 19 May 2016). 
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Ukraine is not a member state and will not become 
one in the foreseeable future either.36 However, 
Moscow’s approach has intensified pre-existing fears, 
especially among NATO’s Central East European mem-
bers, that they might become the object of Russian 
attempts to rearrange the post-Soviet and post-com-
munist space both politically and territorially. In fact, 
it is questionable whether and to what extent Moscow 
even continues to feel bound by the principles of the 
Paris Charter, i.e. the acquis in security policy that 
forms the normative core of what is usually under-
stood by the Euro-Atlantic security order.37 
The second factor linking collective-defence issues 
with NATO’s partnership policy are the military ad-
vances achieved by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
since 2014, and even more so, the organisation’s politi-
cal and territorial claims beyond those two countries. 
While IS currently threatens neither the territorial 
integrity nor the political sovereignty of NATO mem-
bers, the instability in the region exacerbated by its 
advances does have an impact on the Alliance. To date, 
this has shown itself in two ways. The skirmishes 
between Syrian and Turkish forces in 2012 led to 
NATO operation Active Fence, whose aim is to protect 
Turkey from attacks launched from within the neigh-
bouring country torn apart by civil war. Second, Rus-
sian military aircraft repeatedly entered Turkish air-
space. The situation escalated in November 2015 when 
Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber aircraft. 
Against this backdrop of enduring instability on 
NATO’s eastern and southeastern flank, the NATO 
Summit in Wales in 2014 added new forms of coopera-
tion to the already introduced partnership formats. 
In part, these are at odds with the traditional frame-
works; in part they replicate their functions: 
 
a) The goal of the Partnership Interoperability Initiative 
(PII) is to maintain and further enhance the ability 
of external partners to carry out joint military opera-
tions with NATO armed forces. On the one hand, this 
format perpetuates the aspiration of the Connected 
Forces Initiative (CFI), decided in 2012; on the other 
hand, it integrates the activities that were already 
planned within the Partners across the Globe frame-
 
36 Cf. Markus Kaim, Partnership Plus: On the Future of the NATO-
Ukraine Relationship, SWP Comments 28/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2014). 
37 On this point, cf. Markus Kaim, Hanns W. Maull and Kirsten 
Westphal, The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: Three Principles 
for a New Beginning, SWP Comments 18/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2015). 
work.38 To meet these objectives, the defence ministers 
meeting in Wales created an Interoperability Platform, 
which encompasses 24 partner countries from various, 
already existing partnership formats.39 The intention 
is to improve and advance dialogue and practical 
cooperation. 
Within the PII, the Enhanced Opportunities Program 
(EOP) offers five of the partner countries additional 
opportunities for cooperation at their request. They 
are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden – 
countries whose armed forces are considered to be 
particularly interoperable with NATO’s. The options 
for this prominent form of cooperation have not yet 
been spelled out in detail. However, individual state-
ments from NATO circles as well as the first concrete 
measures allow conclusions to be drawn as to what 
the intensified cooperation might consist of. For 
example, NATO has assured the EOP countries that 
they will be able to participate in select manoeuvres. 
Furthermore, Brussels has designated them in prin-
ciple as troop-contributing nations for Alliance opera-
tions. This also gives them the opportunity of filling 
NATO military staff positions with their own officers 
and engaging in extended political dialogue.40 
For Finland and Sweden, NATO complemented the 
EOP by concluding bilateral Host Nation Support Agree-
ments in September 2014. These allow and regulate 
the presence of NATO contingents on the two states’ 
territory, for example in the context of joint exercises. 
The EOP gained a more definite shape on the fringes 
of the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in December 
2015, when NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 
discussed mutual exchange of information with the 
Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström and her 
Finnish counterpart Timo Soini. The main areas were 
hybrid warfare, the coordination of national training 
 
38 Cf. Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Gov-
ernment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Wales, Para. 88, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_ 
112964.htm (accessed 19 May 2016). On the CFI, cf. John R. Deni, 
“Shifting Locus of Governance? The Case of NATO’s Connected 
Forces Initiative”, European Security 25, no. 2 (2016): 181–96. 
39 They are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Australia, Bahrain, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakh-
stan, Morocco, Macedonia, Moldovia, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
New Zealand, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Serbia, South Korea, 
Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. 
40 On this point, cf. the article by the American Ambassador to 
NATO, Douglas Lute, “The Wales Summit: Strengthening NATO 
Partnerships”, 20 November 2014, https://nato.usmission.gov/ 
november-20-2014-the-wales-summit-strengthening-nato-
partnerships/ (accessed 25 May 2016). 
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and exercises, the creation of joint situational awareness 
– especially in the Baltic area – and possible contribu-
tions by the two nations to the NATO Response Force 
(NRF).41 
The NRF is the Alliance’s rapid deployment force, 
consisting of land, air, sea and special forces. Its troop 
contingents are registered on a yearly basis by the 
NATO states, and are then delegated for the corre-
sponding timeframe. Other units take over their func-
tions by rotation. Since the NRF is not an additional 
unit, but relies on existing forces, any Finnish and 
Swedish contributions will be relatively straightfor-
ward to integrate. The Ukraine crisis and NATO’s 
reaction thereto demonstrated that the NRF – and 
thus also the contributions of possible partner coun-
tries – is significant for collective defence purposes. 
To be able to react more quickly to such crises, heads 
of state and government decided at the Wales Summit 
in September 2014 to establish a Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force (VJTF) as part of the NRF.42 
The EOP has also come into focus for Georgia. The 
Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), adopted in 
Wales, comprises a broad range of measures and ini-
tiatives in 13 areas. Its objectives are to enhance 
Georgia’s defence capabilities and boost the interoper-
ability of its troops with NATO armed forces.43 In this 
context, the NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation 
Centre (JTEC), opened by Secretary General Stoltenberg 
on 27 August 2015, is a sort of beacon project.44 
The EOP membership circle could be expanded in 
future, should additional qualified countries show an 
interest. This underlines the programme’s principles: 
while NATO identifies its specific expectations to the 
participants and thus defines the cornerstones of the 
partnership, it is above all the partner nations them-
selves that are expected to specify the political areas in 
which they want to cooperate more closely with NATO 
with regard to interoperability.45 
 
41 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 847 (2015): 4. This agenda 
was discussed in more detail during a visit to the two countries 
by General Petr Pavel, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, 
in April 2016. 
42 Cf. Rainer Glatz and Martin Zapfe, NATO Defence Planning 
between Wales and Warsaw: Politico-military Challenges of a Credible 
Assurance against Russia, SWP Comments 5/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016), 2ff. 
43 For details, cf. “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP)”, 
NATO Fact Sheet, http://nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ 
pdf_2015_12/20151209_151209-factsheet-nato-georgia-
package.pdf (accessed 19 May 2016). 
44 See also European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 820 (2015): 3f. 
45 On the Swedish expectations of the EOP, cf., for example, 
In the run-up to the 2014 Summit, the designation 
of individual states as special partners in cooperating 
with NATO – as sketched out above – was not without 
controversy. This concerned Finland, Georgia and 
Sweden in particular. On the one hand, the decision 
took into account the need for differentiating partners 
more strongly since – according to proponents – they 
differed so greatly in their respective degree of close-
ness to the Alliance. Equal treatment for unequal part-
ner countries in the same category, proponents argued, 
would have signalled to states such as Finland and 
Sweden that their specific expectations would not 
be taken into consideration. A rejection of this sort, 
it was claimed, could have resulted in Helsinki and 
Stockholm turning away from NATO, blocking the 
possibility of improving defence cooperation in 
Northern Europe. 
Critics, on the other hand, objected that Russia 
might interpret the rapprochement of the two Nordic 
countries with NATO as a precursor to full member-
ship. That in turn would reduce Moscow’s willingness 
to cooperate, at a time when its cooperation was espe-
cially critical in light of the great number of political 
crises in the world.46 This argument is even stronger 
for Georgia, which has an unsolved territorial conflict 
with Russia. Ever since the Bucharest Summit of 2008 
held out the prospect of full membership to Georgia, 
member states’ differences of opinion have continued 
unabated on how seriously the Alliance should pursue 
this. The Bucharest compromise reflected the faultline 
between the NATO states that supported full member-
ship for Georgia (and Ukraine) – primarily the USA – 
and those, such as France and Germany, which saw 
the Russian-Georgian tensions as a reason to desist.47 
 
Anna Wieslander, “NATO Turns Its Gaze to the Baltic Region. 
Sweden Should Make Wise Use of NATO’s Benevolent Attitude 
to Establish Closer Relations”, euractiv.com, 18 December 2014, 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/security/nato-turns-its-gaze-
baltic-region-310962 (accessed 19 May 2016). 
46 On this new orientation in Swedish and Finnish security 
policy, cf. Jannicke Fiskvik, Nordische Sicherheit: Eine Annäherung an 
die NATO?, CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik no. 189 (Zurich, 
2016); Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz, Between Military Non-
Alignment and Integration. Finland and Sweden in Search of a New 
Security Strategy, SWP Comments 25/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, April 2015); Ann-Sofie Dahl, NORDEFCO and 
NATO: “Smart Defence” in the North?, NATO Defense College Research 
Paper, 101 (Rome, 2014). 
47 Cf. the Bucharest Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State 
and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed 25 May 2016). On 
Georgia’s ambitions, see Tornike Zurabashvili, “Let Georgia 
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b) The Defence and related Security Capacity Building 
Initiative (DCB) is likewise based on existing NATO 
activities in capacity-building – the measures which 
aim to support, advise and assist other countries’ 
armed forces.48 The DCB is seen as a lasting commit-
ment by the partner countries and as a NATO instru-
ment for projecting stability among its neighbours 
and beyond, without having to transfer larger combat 
units of its own. NATO is unmistakeably performing 
a shift of focus from “security provider” to “security 
consultant”, even though the latter function does not 
completely replace the former.49 
The first partner countries in this context are 
Georgia, Jordan and Moldova. The programme is also 
open to additional states and regional organisations. 
Functionally, it is the equivalent of the EU’s efforts to 
guarantee regional security by supporting key states 
and regional organisations through its Enable and 
Enhance Initiative. The NATO approach corresponds to 
what is often known in Germany’s security policy as 
the enhancement strategy (Ertüchtigungsstrategie). In the 
past, the security policies and military engagements of 
many Euro-Atlantic states were aimed at fundamentally 
redesigning the system of government after a conflict, 
for instance in the Balkans or Afghanistan. The future 
will be primarily about a policy of subsidiarity, which 
enables individual governments or regional organisa-
tions to manage security challenges autonomously, 
and to safeguard peace and international security in 
accordance with the UN Charter.50 
Removed from their respective context, the driving 
forces behind these initiatives are identical. First, the 
phase of liberal interventionism is over. While in the 
 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/georgia/2016-04-12/let-
georgia-join-nato (accessed 19 May 2016); Tedo Japaridze, Georgia 
and NATO: Perpetual Threshold, European Leadership Network, 
11 May 2016. 
48 Cf. Wales Summit Declaration (see note 38), Para. 89. 
49 This is equally true for NATO and the EU. See the comprehen-
sive treatment by Daniel Göler, “Zwischen security provider und 
security consultant. Veränderungen im Leitbild der strategischen 
Kultur der Europäischen Union”, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicher-
heitspolitik 7, no. 3 (2014): 323–42. 
50 Cf., on this point, Majid Satar, “Kosten der Ertüchtigung. 
Deutschland zahlt 100 Millionen Euro an Krisenstaaten”, Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 May 2016; Markus Kaim, “Subsidiäre 
Ertüchtigung. Auslandseinsätze zu verweigern wäre gefährlich”, 
Internationale Politik 70, no. 4 (2015): 94–97; and Marc von Boem-
cken, “Verantwortung durch Ertüchtigung? Ausbildungshilfe 
und Waffenlieferungen als Mittel deutscher Außenpolitik”, in 
Friedensgutachten 2015, ed. Janet Kursawe, Margret Johannsen, 
Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, Marc von Boemcken and Ines-Jacque-
line Werkner (Münster, 2015): 87–99. 
1990s and 2000s, the political class and public opinion 
in the West still had a basically positive attitude to 
multilateral military interventions, this has now been 
superseded by intervention fatigue. There is particular 
scepticism about the goals that such missions might 
attain. The deployments are often successful in the 
short term, at least according to military criteria or 
under the terms of the UN Security Council mandate. 
It is an entirely different question, however, whether 
the intended changes in the political order can be 
realised in the medium or long term. De facto, this 
resulted (and results) in NATO operations that seem 
never-ending, or interventions that must essentially 
be described as political failures soon after their con-
clusion. The impression of pointlessness is one of the 
factors that have led to fundamental concerns in 
many NATO states about military engagements using 
their own troops. 
Second, the multiple, simultaneous crises in the 
European integration process play an important part. 
They have shifted the priorities of Euro-Atlantic politics 
as well. The long-term consequences that these crises 
might have for the integration process and individual 
member states (of the EU and NATO) cannot yet be 
foreseen. However, they have received more attention 
in the past years than international crisis manage-
ment. This does not necessarily mean that it is impos-
sible to imagine a situation in which NATO members 
overcome the domestic political restrictions that 
result from such a prioritisation. However, it would 
require substantial political capital. 
The changed financial parameters also directly 
influence the Alliance’s actions. In many NATO states, 
defence budgets will not increase for many years, or 
only to a limited extent. Many partners will therefore 
have to reduce their capabilities for participating in 
international interventions, or lose them entirely. In 
terms of cooperation among NATO members, the con-
clusion is to strengthen military integration; in terms 
of NATO’s cooperation with a great many partner 
countries, it is capacity-building. 
The NATO partnership formats: 
A mixed track record 
As was pointed out at the beginning, NATO’s partner-
ship formats are a result of changed security para-
meters, but also an expression of the Alliance’s adapt-
ability. Over the past 25 years, it has reacted to the 
changes in its surroundings. However, this adaptation 
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over time has brought about an accumulation of 
partly unconnected, partly overlapping formats. 
The fact that some countries are members of several 
partnership frameworks or enjoy special-status bi-
lateral relationships in addition to partnership illus-
trates these findings. NATO has largely followed the 
guiding principle of “new challenge – new format”: 
it has added new formats of cooperation, but has not 
adapted them in the sense of regularly checking the 
existing partnerships for effectiveness and suitability. 
Just as changes in international security parameters 
provided the impetus for creating the partnership 
formats, they could just as well lead to reforms within 
the formats or to their termination. Given that this 
has not happened, the Alliance’s adaptability needs to 
be evaluated more critically than is usually the case in 
the academic literature. 
Different but parallel objections could be raised for 
the first two partnership formats. The EAPC has quite 
simply outlived its usefulness. In the foreseeable future, 
no states of the post-Soviet area will need to be brought 
closer to NATO and supported in reforming their secu-
rity sector. The few states to which the considerations 
of the EAPC still apply in part (Georgia, Ukraine) or in 
full (Sweden, Finland), have long since been offered 
different forms of cooperation by the Alliance. And, 
for a variety of reasons, neither the MD nor the ICI 
have attained the aims they have pursued, namely 
confidence-building and enhanced intra-regional secu-
rity cooperation. Here, too, NATO shows its tendency 
to expand its relations with individual countries of a 
given partnership format (Tunisia, Jordan, Qatar) by 
bilateralising them. There may be plausible reasons 
in each individual case. However, it undermines the 
regional multilateral approach of the original partner-
ship frameworks. Already, regional security considera-
tions and the partner countries’ relatedness to each 
other no longer underpin the two most recent part-
nership formats. 
Ultimately, the political and material efforts NATO 
expends on the partnership framework are not always 
in proportion to its gains. Since the partnerships have 
not met all their targets and expectations, the Alliance 
is faced with the question of whether it is now time 
to get rid of antiquated practices. However, it remains 
doubtful whether the Alliance can successfully take 
this step. After all, it has been unable to date to im-
pose a hierarchy on its partnerships. An exception is 
its relationship with the European Union. 
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A Special Case: NATO-EU Relations 
 
Alongside its bilateral partnerships – i.e. those with 
individual countries – NATO also maintains a series 
of special, partly institutionalised relations with the 
OSCE, the United Nations, the African Union, and the 
EU. While these are not, strictly speaking, considered 
part of the Alliance’s partnership formats, they are 
nonetheless a functional component of them. As 
forms of cooperation, they too contribute to NATO 
reaching its aims quicker or better or at all. 
Relations between NATO and the EU are the oldest, 
most substantial and at the same time the most com-
plicated. On the one hand, both sides speak of a “stra-
tegic partnership”. On the other hand, Alliance and 
EU representatives complain time and again that the 
potential for cooperation remains unused and point 
out that, given the far-reaching congruence of their 
membership, this is unsatisfactory. 
The two organisations institutionalised their rela-
tions in 2001 when they established joint meetings at 
the ambassadorial and ministerial level. The earlier 
collaboration between the Alliance and the Western 
European Union (EU) provided the basis. In the 1990s, 
at the behest of European NATO members, the WEU 
had been extended into a pillar of Europe inside the 
Alliance and at the same time into a security and 
defence component of the EU. It was intended to take 
on the so-called Petersberg tasks: a specific spectrum 
of priorities that ranges from humanitarian and 
rescue tasks to crisis management, including peace-
making. 
The first concrete cooperation came in 1996 when 
NATO declared itself willing to put its military capa-
bilities at the disposal of the WEU (and later of the EU) 
for crisis-management operations carried out autono-
mously by Europe. This created the core of what later 
developed into the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP). After the 2002 NATO-EU declaration 
on CSDP, the EU was assured access to the Alliance’s 
planning capacities for its own military operations.51 
The Berlin-Plus agreement of March 2003 went one 
step further by giving the EU complete access to 
 
51 EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002, http://www. 
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm (accessed 
19 May 2016). 
NATO’s joint military capabilities, including the re-
quired command structures. The initial assumption 
was that the EU would increasingly carry out military 
interventions in line with its growing international 
security profile, for which it would require NATO sup-
port, without involving NATO as a whole.52 Numerous 
institutional arrangements have since perpetuated 
and consolidated this cooperation. 
The two organisations’ agreement on cooperation 
was first put into practice in 2003, when the NATO-led 
operation for Macedonia, Allied Harmony, merged into 
the EU-led operation Concordia. NATO and the EU ex-
tended their cooperation beyond Europe with the co-
operation in Afghanistan between ISAF and EUPOL 
Afghanistan, responsible for police training, and with 
their parallel fight against piracy around the Horn of 
Africa. 
However, not much remains of the confidence in 
cooperation seen in the 1990s. This can mainly be 
attributed to the completely different ambition levels 
within the two organisations. Just over ten years ago, 
the EU launched an ambitious international security 
programme called European Headline Goal, whose imple-
mentation would have turned it into a power to be 
taken seriously in international crisis management. 
However, its momentum has now flagged. The EU 
states do not seem to have the will to enhance co-
operation in this policy area, nor are the existing insti-
tutions truly used.53 Within NATO, the reverse is true. 
Fifteen years ago, in light of the strategic changes in 
the Euro-Atlantic surroundings, it still looked both 
likely and politically desirable for the Alliance to as-
sume a subordinate role to the Europeans. Since then, 
 
52 Cf. “EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and 
Berlin Plus”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ 
03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf (accessed 
19 May 2016), and Matthias Dembinski, “Die Beziehungen zwischen 
NATO und EU von ‘Berlin’ zu ‘Berlin plus’. Konzepte und Konflikt-
linien”, in Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU. Partnerschaft, Kon-
kurrenz, Rivalität?, ed. Johannes Varwick (Opladen, 2005), 61–80. 
53 On this sobering evaluation, see most recently Anja Opitz, 
“Baujahr 1998 – rostig und ambitioniert. Die GSVP heute”, Poli-
tische Studien 66 (2015), Themenheft no. 2: 41–48; and Michael 
Gahler, “Agonie trotz zunehmender Bedrohungen. Bilanz des 
EU-Verteidigungsgipfels 2015”, Europäische Sicherheit & Technik 64, 
no. 8 (2015): 10–13. 
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however, Russia’s revisionist foreign policy under Presi-
dent Putin and the advances of IS in Syria and Iraq have 
conferred new significance on the Alliance.54 What 
makes the imbalance between the two organisations 
so concerning is that the cited changes in Europe’s 
strategic environment in fact make a coordinated and 
complementary policy more, not less, necessary.55 
There is one further reason for the Alliance’s inter-
est in the EU: it has more experience of partnerships 
as instruments of foreign and security policy. This 
concerns the operational dimension in particular and 
only to a lesser degree formal interinstitutional rela-
tions. National contingents from a great many third 
states have taken part in CSDP missions, thus 
strengthening their legitimacy and effectiveness.56 
Some of them – especially those neighbouring the 
Euro-Atlantic area –also collaborate with NATO in its 
partnership frameworks. A few other states have ex-
perience of cooperating with the EU’s CSDP missions 
that could be interesting for NATO politically and/or 
militarily. Such is the case, for example, of Angola, 
South Africa, Malaysia or the Philippines. In future, 
certain non-European states – for instance, Japan – 
could conceivably decide to assume greater respon-
sibility in international crisis management or to ob-
tain experience in this field while shunning coopera-
tion with NATO for a variety of political reasons. In 
this scenario, they are more likely to seek to cooperate 
with the EU, not least because of its civilian-military 
approach to crisis management. What is needed is a 
more detailed exchange between the two organisa-
tions about their respective partnership agendas and 
experiences. There are some signs that the appropriate 
steps are already being taken, with NATO Secretary 
General Stoltenberg and the EU’s High Representative 
 
54 Cf. Markus Kaim, “Die NATO ist zurück. Die NATO ist die 
Gewinnerin der Ukraine-Krise, nicht die europäische Außen-
politik”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 28 July 2015 (online), 
http://www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik/ 
artikel/die-nato-ist-zurueck-1008/ (accessed 19 May 2016). 
55 Within the extensive body of literature on the EU-NATO rela-
tionship, cf. Nina Graeger and John Todd, Still a “Strategic” EU-
NATO Partnership? Bridging Governance Challenges through Practical 
Cooperation, PISM Policy Paper, 21 (Warsaw, 2015); and Henna 
Hopia, Breaking Down the Walls. Improving EU-NATO Relations 
(Brussels, 2013). 
56 For a list of third-state contributions, cf. Thierry Tardy, CSDP: 
Getting Third States on Board, EUISS Issue Brief, 6/2014 (Paris, 2014), 
3. On their participation in the EU’s decision-making processes, 
see also Valentin Misteli, “EU Associates: Third-State Involvement 
in EU Foreign Policy Decision-Making”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review 18, no. 2 (2013): 255–72. 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica 
Mogherini, having discussed the issue in December 
2015. Among other topics, they debated how better to 
coordinate NATO and EU activities aimed at strength-
ening the security sector of partner countries, espe-
cially in the Middle East and North Africa.57 
In the past year, the NATO-EU partnership has once 
again attracted greater attention because two further 
areas of cooperation have been added to this joint 
effort to enhance third states’ defensive capacities: 
the handling of so-called hybrid threats and issues of 
maritime cooperation. NATO already cooperates with 
the EU’s Frontex mission, which has, since February 
2016, provided reconnaissance, surveillance and ob-
servation of boat and ship movements in the Aegean 
Sea between Greece and Turkey. Its objective is to con-
tain the uncontrolled movement of refugees towards 
Europe.58 There are signs that the international waters 
off the coast of Libya may become the setting for a 
comparable cooperative mission. The ships, aircraft 
and helicopter of the EU operation EUNAVFOR Med 
are already monitoring the sea. Their reconnaissance 
results contribute to the larger picture being drawn 
up of the activities of people-smugglers who attempt 
to bring in migrants, mainly to Italy. The mission’s 
ships are authorised to stop and search boats in inter-
national waters on suspicion of being used by smug-
glers. Such boats can be confiscated and diverted. It 
is also possible to take those suspected of people-
smuggling on board a warship and hand them over 
to an EU member state.59 
Additionally, following an Italian initiative, NATO 
has changed the mandate of its Operation Active Endeav-
our, which ran from 2001 to 2016. For 15 years, its 
objective was to contribute to discovering and deter-
ring terrorist activities in the Mediterranean through 
surveillance of civilian sea traffic. The follow-up Opera-
tion Sea Guardian is providing support to maritime 
situational awareness and to counter-terrorism at sea, 
and contributing to maritime security capacity-build-
ing. By doing so it has taken on a complementary role 
to EUNAVFOR Med in maritime surveillance. 
 
57 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 847 (2015): 4. See also 
Jeffrey A. Larsen, Time to Face Reality: Priorities for NATO’s 2016 War-
saw Summit, NATO Defense College Research Paper, 126 (Rome, 
2016), 14. 
58 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 873 (2016): 6f. 
59 Cf. European External Action Service, “EUNAVFOR MED opera-
tion SOPHIA”, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/eunavfor-med/index_en.htm (accessed 25 May 2016). 
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Conclusions 
 
Even though reforming the NATO partnership frame-
works will probably not play the leading role at NATO 
deliberations in 2017, it will nonetheless be urgent to 
set the course in this policy area. The issue is signifi-
cant primarily because the partnerships have become 
relevant for almost all NATO functions and are hence 
a cross-sectional topic. However, institutional prolif-
eration and path-dependent growth are also hallmarks 
of the partnership policy. 
If NATO were to reorganise the entire tableau of 
partnership formats from scratch today, it would be 
logical to group them more clearly into different “bas-
kets”, which would give equal footing to functional 
necessities and the issue of shared political princi-
ples.60 To call for institutional or political coherence 
may seem logical. However, it is probably unrealistic 
in a policy area that has grown for 25 years in accord-
ance with varying goals and priorities and that was 
ultimately shaped for maximum flexibility. A wealth 
of political considerations makes it unlikely that 
NATO will “close” individual partnership frameworks. 
The Alliance is more likely to take into account the 
potential impact on the governments of the partner 
nations concerned – which would feel rejected – and 
engage in an incremental “muddling-through” in 
creating new partnership formats and further devel-
oping existing ones. 
There is nevertheless a series of principles for a mod-
erate reorganisation of this policy area in the next year: 
First, NATO should proceed on the assumption 
that in the coming years partnerships with individual 
countries, groups of countries or organisations will 
increase in significance. This assumption derives from 
member states’ increasing unwillingness to provide 
NATO with the necessary resources, but most of all 
from the domestic political change in many NATO 
states. Anti-integrationist and anti-globalist forces that 
turn their backs on international cooperation in secu-
rity policy are currently very much in the ascendant. 
Conversely, proponents of NATO actively and force-
 
60 For a proposal on how to reorganise the partnerships insti-
tutionally, cf. Karl-Heinz Kamp and Heidi Reisinger, NATO’s Part-
nerships after 2014: Go West!, NATO Defense College Research Paper, 
92 (Rome, 2013), 6. 
fully shaping international relations are on the 
defensive. If one assumes that the Alliance’s portfolio 
of responsibilities will at the very least remain un-
changed, or even grow, in the coming years, then part-
nerships must be maintained and developed further 
so as to safeguard NATO’s functionality. 
Second, the governments of NATO members should 
keep their expectations realistic as far as any upgrad-
ing of the partnership policy or formats is concerned. 
Partnerships may well selectively expand NATO’s pos-
sibilities for political and military action. However, it 
would be unrealistic to assume that they can provide 
lasting assistance in reducing the Alliance’s own com-
mitments or even making them entirely obsolete. 
After all, partner nations remain autonomous – i.e. 
they are free not to act in accordance with NATO’s 
wishes. Moreover, governments can be replaced in 
office and new priorities fixed. Not least, it is likely 
that structural shifts will still occur within the inter-
national system in future and have an impact on 
NATO’s partnerships. 
Third, NATO should make its goals within the indi-
vidual partnership frameworks clearer. At the same 
time, these goals should be subdivided into detailed 
action programmes lasting one to two years, so that 
the success or failure of a given approach is easier to 
identify. The approach that has already begun with 
the Individual Partnership Action Plans should be ex-
panded as it is the only way of guaranteeing political 
momentum. Too often individual partnership activ-
ities give the impression that such momentum is 
lacking and that a bureaucratic perspective predomi-
nates instead. 
Fourth, it is crucial that the Alliance more clearly 
prioritises the partnership formats politically. In light 
osf the changed security parameters, it is at best ques-
tionable whether NATO will deliberately externalise 
security in the foreseeable future by forming bonds 
with third states or promoting intra-regional coopera-
tion – the factors that drove the first two waves of 
partnerships. However, more significance is likely to 
be given to the concern to enhance the Alliance’s 
capabilities indirectly, through improved cooperation 
and enhanced capacity-building in other countries, 
so that NATO can take on tasks in international crisis 
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management as well as guarantee collective defence. 
This approach should also be reflected in its partner-
ship policy. 
This goes hand in hand with the fifth principle, 
the necessity to prioritise partners – some are more 
important to NATO than others. That may change 
again when the challenges change. However, the Al-
liance should clearly emphasise its current priorities, 
not to demote other partner countries, but to under-
line its esteem for its closest partners in cooperation 
and to motivate those to continue working together. 
Sixth, an institutional prioritisation would also 
be logical. Out of the first two partnership waves, the 
formats that pursue a multilateral approach – in the 
sense of focusing on the partner nations’ intercon-
nectedness in security matters – have shown them-
selves to be unwieldy and not very effective. By con-
trast, formats which loosely group together partner 
countries according to their respective function for 
NATO, such as the two most recent frameworks, seem 
to be more useful for NATO, even though they are less 
ambitious. In essence, these formats bring together a 
series of bilateralisms within an overarching frame-
work. NATO’s tendency to “bilateralise” partnership 
formats has been perceptible since the foreign minis-
ters’ meeting in Berlin in April 2011. It suggests the 
right priorities and should be further consolidated. 
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